jautājums |
atbilde |
sākt mācīties
|
|
preceding experience and observation; only by thinking about our way of observing events we can conclude that there is sth like causality; we give the meaning to those sequences by presupposing causality
|
|
|
synthetic a priori knowledge sākt mācīties
|
|
"all phenomena have a cause"; "the world as we observe is three dimensional"
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
the idea that only empirical data may count as good reasons for defending scientific claims
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
valid, deductive argument
|
|
|
deductive-nomological model of science sākt mācīties
|
|
we have a law from which we deduce our conclusions
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
going from particular observations to general claims in inductive reasoning one goes from a set of particular observed phenomena and draws a conclusion about a general law applicable to phenomena which have not been yet observed
|
|
|
correspondence model of truth sākt mācīties
|
|
a claim is true if it corresponds with reality
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
i.e. we can observe that apple is green
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
|
|
|
What makes a theoretical concept for grasping non-observable phenomena into a good concept sākt mācīties
|
|
Robustness, Fit, Predictability
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
a concept should be usable in more than one context and it may mean that it will cover a set of phenomena
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
claims that one makes using these concepts, should fit into a more general theory
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
using a particular concept, one should be able to make a trustworthy predictions about the occurrence of the phenomenon referred to nay the concept
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
there will always be many reason-giving considerations that support the truth of a particular claim
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
knowledge should only be based on experience and observations; the main thesis of logical positivism is verificationism
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
only claims which can be verified through empirical observations can have any meaning, therefore can be true or false
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
it is sth that we cannot verify through observations or sensory experience; something above physics that is driving everything; i.e. religion
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
Rationalism, Empiricism, Idealism
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
thinking is the basis for all knowledge; thinking is what crates knowledge; no empirical evidence
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
all knowledge comes from observation; it lacks causality, no theory, we cannot predict; we cannot transfer data into knowledge cuz we lack structure
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
all knowledge comes from experience; the ability to structure experience is the idea; the problem is the question where these ideas come from
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
rather than assuming that we have the ability to know before we experience anything we now have sth very powerful called logic to organise our experience
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
logical nonsense, logical truth/analytical statements, metaphysics, empirical truth/synthetic statement
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
all statatemsnt that we know ain't true before experiencing them
|
|
|
logical truth/analytical statements sākt mācīties
|
|
we don't need to observe it cuz by definition it is true; "the bachelor is unmarried"
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
knowledge that we cannot verify through observations
|
|
|
empirical truth/synthetic statement sākt mācīties
|
|
we can verify its truth through observations
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
truth of statement depends on a matter of fact; through observation; this circle has diameter of 10 meter
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
truth of statement depends on the logical structure of a statement; logical analysis; this circle is round
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
for every statement in the system of knowledge for that statement to be true one should be able to use logical and through logic to go back to your individual experience
|
|
|
the unity of science ideal sākt mācīties
|
|
all knowledge should be able to put in a simple system
|
|
|
Problems in logical positivism sākt mācīties
|
|
theoretical concepts, problem of induction
|
|
|
Theoretical concepts - LP problems sākt mācīties
|
|
certain concepts cannot be reduced to observations alone; hence we employ intensional and extensional meanings of concepts
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
conjuztion of general properties that together define a concept
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
the set of all real-life phenomena that together define the concept
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
mąkę up the properties of a concept; firm performance determine earnings and ROE
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
made up of its respective properties; democracy can only be a democracy when there are free elections
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
allowing both theoretical concepts may happen when they explain something that is not apparent from observation alone and the use of these concepts lead to the development of new knowledge to be tested
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
drawing general conclusions from a finite number of observations; new information can change the truth value of the conclusion
|
|
|
sākt mācīties
|
|
drawing specific conclusions through referring to general rules; new information has no influence upon the truth value of the conclusion
|
|
|